Thesis Statements Freud

Since Freud’s time psychoanalysts have allowed a major gap to grow between psychoanalysis and other scientific approaches.The following discussion is representative of a larger pattern in the (non) dialog between psychoanalysis and neuro-biology: Edelman (1992), in Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, described the conversation he used to have with Jacques Monod on Freud.The study of patients with brain damage has brought out evidence about even more complex unconscious processes.

Since Freud’s time psychoanalysts have allowed a major gap to grow between psychoanalysis and other scientific approaches.The following discussion is representative of a larger pattern in the (non) dialog between psychoanalysis and neuro-biology: Edelman (1992), in Bright Air, Brilliant Fire, described the conversation he used to have with Jacques Monod on Freud.The study of patients with brain damage has brought out evidence about even more complex unconscious processes.

In conclusion we propose that current experimental and theoretical works reveal that the opposition between Freudian and cognitive unconscious rests on a methodological misunderstanding. Relationship between latency and duration for highest and lowest frequencies by word category.

(Left) Unconscious conflict words (U); (middle) conscious symptom words (C); (right) Osgood unpleasant words (E–). One of the first and most persistent criticisms of Freud is that the existence of unconscious representations is self-contradictory.

Everything that Freud said applies to me, and none of it to you.” Both Edelman and Jacob are materialists, at least naturalists.

Does it mean that for them, the existence of the Freudian unconscious depends on the opinion we have on Freud’s theories and not on facts?

More recently, functionalism has articulated claims that are structurally homologous to Freud’s, according to which cognition is a sub-personal computation of internal representations.

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Some philosophers still object to such talk, on the basis of the supposition that representation is by nature conscious (Searle, 1992).

They posit: (1) that some psychological processes are unconsciously performed and causally determine conscious processes, (2) that they are governed by their own cognitive rules, (3) that they set out their own intentions, (4) and that they lead to a conflicting organization of psyche.

We show that each of these postulates is the subject of empirical and theoretical works.

If the two fields refer to more or less similar mechanisms, we propose that their opposition rests on an epistemological misunderstanding.

As a conclusion, we promote a conservative reunification of the two perspectives.