In a note to Pehle, he claimed that the War Department had carried out a “study” of the feasibility of such bombing raids.However, historians have never been able to locate a copy of any such study in the relevant archives.Generally, these requests were made in private meetings with Allied officials; only on a few occasions were they articulated in public.Tags: Physics Solved Problems Free DownloadCake Business Plan SampleSpace Junk Research PaperExample Of Apa Format EssayEssay Individuality Vs ConformityThesis On Demand And SupplyRosencrantz And Guildenstern Essay QuestionsSociological Imagination Autobiography EssayIsb Hyderabad Essays 2011
On the other hand, the effectiveness of bombing the tracks depended upon the ability of the bombers to hit their targets–something impossible to determine in advance–and the ability of the Germans to repair damaged track lines.
Likewise, with regard to a possible bombing of the gas chambers and crematoria, it was impossible to predict how successful Allied bombers would be in carrying out precision attacks on those targets. The proposal to send ground troops was the most radical.
Kubowitzki cited the principle of “hayei shaa,” that is, focusing on the fact that someone is still alive, albeit in danger.
Later, he appeared to regret opposing bombing, confiding to a colleague: “With regard to the bombing of the death camps and many other questions, there is no doubt that I did not have as much information as I needed…”.
Almost certainly it would have involved casualties to the attacking forces, and for that reason was the proposal least likely to be accepted by Allied military commanders and political leaders.
Moreover, requesting an attack by ground troops played to one of American Jewish leaders’ worst fears: the accusation that Jews were willing to risk the lives of Allied soldiers for their own narrow interests.
THE ROOSEVELT ADMINISTRATION’S POSITION In general, the Roosevelt administration was strongly opposed, as a matter of principle, to taking any special action to aid Jewish refugees.
The administration’s declared policy, until early 1944, was “rescue through victory,” that is, rescue of Jews could be accomplished only through victory over the Germans on the battlefield.
Mc Cloy further wrote that bombing the railways was “impracticable” because it would require “the diversion of considerable air support essential to the success of our forces now engaged in decisive operations…” In fact, the Allies were already operating in the skies above Auschwitz and did not have to be “diverted” from elsewhere in order to reach the death camp.
Since April 4, Allied planes had been carrying out photo reconnaissance missions in the area around Auschwitz, in preparation for attacking German oil factories and other industrial sites in the region, some of which were situated just a few miles from the gas chambers and crematoria. Gruenbaum explained the rationale for bombing Auschwitz and the railways leading to it, and asked to send a telegram to that effect to the War Refugee Board.